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Abstract
In this paper, security of practically decoy state quantum key distribution under fake state attack
is considered. If quantum key distribution is insecure under this type of attack, decoy sources can
not also provide it with enough security. Strictly analysis shows that Eve should eavesdrop with the
aid of photon-number-resolving instruments. In practical implementation of decoy state quantum
key distribution where statistical fluctuation is considered, however, Eve can attack it successfully
with threshold detectors.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an important application of quantum information,
with which two distant parties (the information sender, Alice and the information receiver,
Bob) can share a string of secure key with the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve [1–3]. It has
been proven that quantum principles can provide it with unconditional security when it is
implemented with ideal devices [4–6]. In practical implementation of QKD, however, real-life
devices are taken used. They are imperfect and apt to some sophisticated eavesdropping [7–
17], part of which have been realized with lab settings. Furthermore, in QKD realization,
Alice and Bob’s experimental conditions are assumed to be based on present technology but
Eve’s ability is only limited by quantum principles. Then those eavesdropping schemes still
lacking experimental demonstration should also be considered seriously. Recently, fake state
attack is experimentally proven to be fatal to some commercial quantum key distribution
systems, with which the latent eavesdropper can obtain full information shared between
Alice and Bob without been detected [13–17].
The fake state attack is a type of intercept-resent attack, where Eve blocks all Alice’s
pulses and measures them on randomly chosen bases. Then she prepares her measurement
results on fresh pulses and transfers them to Bob. At the same time, she controls Bob’s
detectors to work in linear mode: if Bob has the same basis choices as Eve, Eve’s pulses will
provide enough power above the threshold value to generate triggers and Bob gets Eve’s
bit values; when their basis choices are different, however, Eve’s pulses are split below the
threshold intensity and unable to introduce click on Bob’s detectors. It is apparent that
Eve’s intervention introduces tolerably error rate and generates identical key string as the
legal users’. Then Alice and Bob will acknowledge the validity of their key and ignore
Eve’s presence. With a half probability, Bob and Eve will have the same choices on their
measurement bases. Thus Eve may eavesdrop on their communication successfully if the
combining efficiency of the quantum channel and the measurement devices is less than 1
2
.
Suppose Alice has a weaken coherent source whose photon number obeys Poisson distri-
bution
pn(µ) =
µn
n!
e−µ, (1)
where µ is average intensity of the source and n is photon number of the incoming pulses.
She randomly chooses her bases and prepares her bit values on the pulses, then she transfers
them to Bob. To avoid being caught on line, Eve must make Bob’s gains and error rates
identical to that when there is no eavesdropper. That is, Eve must make her eavesdropping
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satisfy
1
2
ηf
∑
∞
n=1 pn(µ) =
∑
∞
n=0 pn(µ)[1− (1− pd)
2(1− η)n],
efηf
∑
∞
n=1 pn(µ) =
∑
∞
n=0 pn(µ){1− (1− pd)
2(1− η)n − (1− pd)
× [(1− ηed)
n − (1− η + ηed)
n]}.
(2)
Here ηf is the probability Eve will prepare fresh pulses according to her measurement re-
sults, ef is the probability she prepares wrong bit value on the fresh pulses. And ed is the
probability of misalignment between Alice and Bob. If Eve can keep alignment between her
measurement bases and Alice’s preparing bases, and that between her preparing bases and
Bob’s measurement bases at the same time, she can control the error rate on Bob’s results
at her will. Furthermore, practical QKD system is very lossy [18], the relationships in Eq.
(2) should be simulated by Eve easily. Thus if Eve can blind Bob’s detectors, the QKD
system will be totally insecure.
In practical implementation of QKD, decoy sources are usually added in [19–21]. They
have the same characters with that of signal source apart from their average intensities, that
is
pn(ν) =
νn
n!
e−ν . (3)
Alice randomly encodes her bit value on signal source or decoy sources. Eve can not tell
the decoy sources from the signal source, then she must treat all sources in the same way.
Furthermore, she should mock the loss and noise in the quantum channel. Or else, her
intervention will inevitably introduce different disturbances on Bob’s results from different
sources. It is easy to verify that the relationship in Eq. (2) can not be met for the signal
source and the decoy sources at the same time. In order to eavesdrop on the decoy state
QKD, Eve should have the ability of differentiating photon number, with which she can
treat pulses with the same photons similarly.
In photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack, Eve is assumed to have ability of differentiating
photon number in pulses without affect their polarizations [7–9]. Then quantum nondemoli-
tion (QND) measurement on photon number is required, and this is still missed with present
technology. In the fake state attack, however, Eve can measure polarizations on the pulses
directly, which means she can get photon number and polarization of the pulses at the same
time with photon-number-resolving detectors [22, 23]. If she has the ability of differentiate
photon number, she can treat pulses with the same photons in a similar way. In order to
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simulate the lossy and noise for all sources, Eve’s eavesdropping should satisfy
1
2
ηfn = 1− (1− pd)
2(1− η)n,
efnη
f
n = 1− (1− pd)
2(1− η)n − (1− pd)[(1− ηed)
n − (1− η + ηed)
n].
(4)
Here ηfn and e
f
n have similar definition as that in Eq. (2), but they corresponds to pulses
with definite photon number n. Eve detects nothing from Alice when n = 0, however,
she should prepare random-bit-value pulses with probability 4pd − 2p
2
d in order to simulate
dark count rate on Bob’s detectors. Noticing that Eq. (4) has nothing to do with pn(µ)
and pn(ν), thus Eve can eavesdrop on the decoy state QKD successfully if she has a set of
photon-number-resolving detectors.
Now it is interesting whether Eve can eavesdrop on the decoy state QKD protocol without
photon-number-resolving detectors. However, as mentioned before, eavesdropping on the
decoy sources should have similar relationships as those in Eq. (2), that is,
1
2
ηf
∑
∞
n=1 pn(ν) =
∑
∞
n=0 pn(ν)[1 − (1− pd)
2(1− η)n],
efηf
∑
∞
n=1 pn(ν) =
∑
∞
n=0 pn(ν){1− (1− pd)
2(1− η)n − (1− pd)
× [(1− ηed)
n − (1− η + ηed)
n]}.
(5)
And one can find that there are not such ηf and ef to meat the relationships in Eq. (2)
and those in Eq. (5) at the same time. However, considering the imperfection of practical
implementation of decoy state QKD, the relationships in Eq. (2) and Eq. (5) may be loosen.
Experimentally, Alice and Bob’s key is distributed within a finite period of time, generally
in several hours [24]. Then the pulses generated by Alice should also be finite. We assume
the number of pulses emitted from the sources is N = 1010 in the following discussion.
If Bob’s expectingly detections is pdet under ideal circumstance, and his detecting events
with finite resources is p′det, p
′
det should deviate from pdet with a small fluctuation δpdet . The
probability P (|pdet − p
′
det| > δpdet) can be estimated to be less than q = exp(−
Nδ2pdet
4pdet
). If
we require q = exp(−25),
δ2pdet
pdet
can be estimated to be 10−8 approximately, and δpdet can be
calculated as 10−4p
1
2
det accordingly. Thus in practical implementation of fake state attack,
Eve should ensure Bob’s detecting events satisfy
pdet − 10
−4p
1
2
det < p
′
det < pdet + 10
−4p
1
2
det. (6)
Strictly speaking, the statistical fluctuations on different sources are usually not the same
as the number of pulses generated from different sources may be not assigned to be the same.
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At the same time, the probabilities of detecting events for different sources are not identical
because of their disparate intensities. As the total number of the pulses is N , the practical
number of pulses assigned for different sources should be less than this value, the practically
tolerant fluctuation should be greater than that in Eq. (6). It means Alice and Bob should
accept the validity of their results if the statistical fluctuations on the detecting events from
every sources satisfy the relationship in Eq. (6). And similar relationship can be obtained
for the gain of QBER on every source, that is
perr − 10
−4p
1
2
err < p
′
err < perr + 10
−4p
1
2
err. (7)
It is apparent that Bob’s expecting detecting results should be pdet(µ) = 1− (1−pd)
2e−ηµ
for signal source, and pdet(ν) = 1 − (1 − pd)
2e−ην for decoy sources. And the actual de-
tecting events for them should be p′det(µ) =
1
2
ηf (1 − e
−µ) and p′det(ν) =
1
2
ηf (1 − e
−ν)
respectively. Similarly, the expecting error rate for signal source and decoy sources are
perr(µ) =
1
2
∑
∞
n=0 pn(µ){1 − (1 − pd)
2(1 − η)n − (1 − pd)[(1 − ηed)
n − (1 − η + ηed)
n]} and
perr(ν) =
1
2
∑
∞
n=0 pn(ν){1 − (1− pd)
2(1− η)n − (1− pd)[(1− ηed)
n − (1− η + ηed)
n]}. And
the actual error rate for them can be calculated as p′err(µ) =
1
2
efηf(1− e
−µ) = efp
′
det(µ) and
p′err(ν) =
1
2
efηf(1− e
−ν) = efp
′
det(ν).
We can estimate the feasibility of Eve’s attack with the experimental parameters in [18],
that is, pd = 8.5 × 10
−7, ηB = 4.5%, ed = 3.3% and loss coefficient α in the quantum
channel is 0.21 dB/km. If the transmission distance between Alice and Bob is 120km, one
can obtain η = 1.359 × 10−4. When there are only two sources, that is, a signal source
with intensity µ = 0.479 and a weaker decoy state with intensity ν = 0.127 [24]. As the
statistical fluctuations on the the results of signal source satisfy the relationships in Eq. (6)
and Eq. (7), its ηf should range from 3.467 × 10
−4 to 3.553 × 10−4, and its ef can range
from 4.178 × 10−2 to 4.806 × 10−2. Similarly, statistical fluctuation on the the results of
weaker decoy source should satisfy the relationships in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7), its ηf can be
calculated to range from 3.106× 10−4 to 3.252× 10−4, and its ef ranges from 6.705× 10
−2
to 8.307×10−2. As there is no overlap on the parameters of both sources, it seems that Eve
can not eavesdrop on the decoy state QKD protocol with threshold detectors.
Noticing that the dark count rate functions importantly in practical implementation of
decoy state QKD protocol when the transmission distance is comparably long. Furthermore,
though threshold detectors can not tell the photon number in the incoming pulses, they
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can differentiate vacuum pulses from non-vacuum pulses. Then it may help Eve with her
eavesdropping if she treats the vacuum pulses and non-vacuum pulses in different ways. She
prepares random-bit-value pulses with probability 4pd − 2p
2
d for Bob when she detecting
nothing from Alice. It is easily verified that Eve’s eavesdropping results on the vacuum
pulses coincide well with what Bob expecting for. When there is nonvacuum pulses, she
makes fresh pulses according to her results with probability ηf and introduces error on
them with probability ed. Here Eve makes error on the nonvacuum pulses with probability
ed because errors introduced on nonvacuum pulses are mainly introduced by misalignment
between Alice and Bob. Then for signal source, one can obtain
1
2
ηf
∑
∞
n=1 pn(µ) =
∑
∞
n=1 pn(µ)[1− (1− pd)
2(1− η)n],
ηfed
∑
∞
n=1 pn(µ) =
∑
∞
n=1 pn(µ){1− (1− pd)
2(1− η)n − (1− pd)
× [(1− ηed)
n − (1− η + ηed)
n]}.
(8)
Similar relationship can also be obtained for decoy source.
The probability of expecting detections pdet both for signal source and decoy source can
still be calculated as that above. However, the actual detections p′det for them are altered
slightly. That is, p′det(µ) = e
−µ[1 − (1 − pd)
2] + 1
2
ηf (1 − e
−µ) and p′det(ν) = e
−ν [1 − (1 −
pd)
2] + 1
2
ηf (1 − e
−ν). Similarly, the expressions for perr(µ) and perr(ν) are still the same.
And p′err(µ) and p
′
err(ν) should be recalculated as
1
2
e−µ[1− (1− pd)
2] + 1
2
edηf(1− e
−µ) and
1
2
e−ν [1− (1− pd)
2] + 1
2
edηf (1− e
−ν) respectively. As their statistical fluctuations should still
be bounded with the relations in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7). With simple calculation, we find
there is no such ηf for signal source, and ηf for decoy source ranges from 2.855 × 10
−4 to
3.001 × 10−4. That is, this scheme is still inefficient in helping Eve to eavesdrop on decoy
state QKD protocol with threshold detectors.
Eve takes control the whole quantum channel, however, she may not set her eavesdrop
point adjacent to Alice’s lab. Her intervention site may be anywhere between Alice’s and
Bob’s labs. We will show that this change will help Eve to Eavesdrop on the decoy state
QKD protocol successfully with threshold detectors. Let the distance between Alice’s lab
and Bob’s eavesdropping site be l km, it is apparent smaller l requires ability to discriminate
photon number in the pulses, and larger l may lead to failure of her blinding attack. Then
the optimal site should have largest l where Eve can carry out her eavesdropping successfully.
The transmission efficiency at this point can be calculated as ηl = 10
−
αl
10 . And the statistical
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distribution in the incoming pulses can be represented as
pln(µ) =
(ηlµ)
n
n!
e−ηlµ,
pln(ν) =
(ηlν)
n
n!
e−ηlν .
(9)
If Eve takes her eavesdropping scheme as that in Eq. (8), one can obtain
1
2
ηf
∑
∞
n=1 p
l
n(µ) =
∑
∞
n=1 p
l
n(µ)[1− (1− pd)
2(1− η′)n],
ηfed
∑
∞
n=1 p
l
n(µ) =
∑
∞
n=1 p
l
n(µ){1− (1− pd)
2(1− η′)n − (1− pd)
× [(1− η′ed)
n − (1− η′ + η′ed)
n]},
(10)
with η′ = ηb10
−
120−l
10 for signal source. And similar relationships can be obtained for decoy
source
1
2
ηf
∑
∞
n=1 p
l
n(ν) =
∑
∞
n=1 p
l
n(µ)[1− (1− pd)
2(1− η′)n],
ηfed
∑
∞
n=1 p
l
n(ν) =
∑
∞
n=1 p
l
n(µ){1− (1− pd)
2(1− η′)n − (1− pd)
× [(1− η′ed)
n − (1− η′ + η′ed)
n]}.
(11)
As Eve’s detecting efficiency is very lower, it is easy to verify that Eve can set l = 120 km.
We can then obtain ηf ranging from 8.893 × 10
−2 to 9.120 × 10−2 for signal source, and it
ranges from 8.775× 10−2 to 9.229× 10−2 for decoy source. Then Eve can launch fake state
attack at l = 120 km with threshold detectors just by preparing what she have measured
with probability ηf ranging from 8.893× 10
−2 to 9.120× 10−2, and she introduces error on
them with probability ed.
Then when statistical fluctuation is considered, Eve can eavesdropping on decoy state
QKD even with threshold detectors. She may fail to eavesdrop successfully when her inter-
vention site is closer to Alice’s lab, and numerical simulation shows it may be easier for her
to attack on this protocol when her intervention site is farer away from Alice’s lab. This
is because the nearer to Bob’s lab, the greater probability of single-photon pulses for non-
vacuum pulses can be obtained. Then Eve can omit the effect of multi-photon pulses treat
all pulses as single photons. In practical decoy state QKD protocol, Alice may introduce
vacuum decoy state to estimate the dark counts on Bob’s detectors. [24]. As Eve prepares
random-bit-value pulses with probability 4pd − 2p
2
d when she detects nothing, however, the
statistical fluctuations on the vacuum decoy state can be verified to be met automatically.
In order to understand Eve’s eavesdropping better, we give a simulation numerically on the
relation between Eve’s ηf and her intervention site l, as is plotted as that in Fig. 1. It shows
that there is not suitable ηf and for signal source when l ≤ 10 km. Furthermore, Eve can
7
not launch her fake state attack on this protocol when her intervention site l is less than 30
km as there is no overlap on ηf for both sources. When l is greater than 45 km, one can
find the suitable ηf for signal source also suits for decoy source.
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FIG. 1: Relationship between Eve’s probability for her to prepare fresh pulses according to her
results, ηf and her intervention site, l. It suitable value should be chosen from the area greater
than the lower bounds and less than the upper bounds of ηf for both sources.
It has been proven that some commercial QKD systems may be totally insecure under
fake state attack [14–17], thus we hope that decoy states is efficiency in combatting against
this brutal attack. As we have shown above, however, decoy states can not also provide them
with enough security. We have shown that Eve can launch her fake state attack successfully.
Especially, we have proven that she can eavesdrop on the decoy state QKD without any
photon-number-resolving instrument when statistical fluctuation is considered on Bob’s re-
sults. With the presence of new technology, especially with improvement on Bob detecting
efficiency, Alice and Bob may overcome this loophole. However, other loopholes still un-
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known to people may also threaten the security of practical QKD. And it has been claimed
QKD is superior to classical cryptography as quantum principle provide it with physically
secure. In order to avoid the mouse and cat game between legal users and eavesdropper in
QKD, new protocols should be presented to combat all these loopholes in principle [25–28].
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